The Mine Run Campaign was a short-lived Union offensive that pitted the Army of the Potomac against the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia from November 26–December 2, 1863 in Orange County, Virginia.
Following the Union victory at the Battle of Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863) Major General George G. Meade's Army of the Potomac cautiously pursued General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia as it retreated into Virginia. Despite encounters at the Battle of Williamsport (July 6–16, 1863), the Battle of Boonsboro (July 8, 1863), and the Battle of Manassas Gap (July 23, 1863), Meade was unable to prevent Lee's escape and called off the chase.
In September, Confederate officials pressured Lee into sending Lieutenant General James Longstreet's 1st Corps to Chattanooga to reinforce Lieutenant General Braxton's Bragg's Army of Tennessee, which was being battered by Major General William Rosecrans' Army of the Cumberland. When Meade learned that Lee had weakened his army, he decided to renew his pursuit. In mid-September Meade sent two columns forward to engage the remnants of Lee's army, which was encamped along the Rapidan River.
The tables quickly turned, however, when Washington officials ordered Meade's 11th and 12th Corps to Tennessee after the Confederate victory at the Battle of Chickamauga (September 19–20, 1863). With the size of Meade's army also depleted, Lee responded by crossing the Rappahannock River in early October and launching an offensive aimed at Meade's right flank. Meade reacted by beginning a withdrawal toward Centerville.
The two armies parried for the next month during the Bristoe Campaign, until Union victories at the Battle of Bristoe Station (October 14, 1863) and the Battle of Rappahannock Station (November 7, 1863) forced Lee to move south and to concede the land between the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers.
As Lee was redeploying his army in defensive positions south of the Rapidan River beginning the second week of November, Meade was busy trying to quiet his critics in Washington by devising a final offensive against his adversary before the onset of winter. Two weeks later he was ready to move.
On November 26, 1863, Meade's 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Corps (commanded by Major Generals Gouverneur K. Warren, William H. French, and George Sykes, respectively) moved southeast out of Culpepper Court House toward the Rapidan River. Meade planned for each of the corps to cross the river at Jacob's Ford and then quickly to swing west in three columns and attack Lee's right flank near Mine Run, a small stream flowing north to the Rapidan. The success of the operation depended upon the element of surprise.
Unfortunately for Meade, the weather and some poor generalship combined to eliminate any chance he had to catch Lee off guard. French was first in line for the crossing, and he had trouble getting his men and artillery to the other side of the swollen Rapidan, creating a bottleneck for the other two corps. Once across the river, French made a wrong turn and got lost on his way to Mine Run. By the time that all of the Union forces were in position to launch their assault, the day was spent, and Confederate scouts had discovered their whereabouts. Alerted to the Yankees' presence, Lee quickly dispatched his 2nd Corps, commanded by Major General Jubal Early, to intercept them.
Elements of the two armies collided the next day (November 27) on the east side of Mine Run in a dense tangle of trees and brush locally known as the Wilderness. The next year, during the Overland Campaign, the Wilderness would be the site of some of the more horrific combat of the Civil War. While both sides hastened to send troops to the front, intense fighting at locations such as Robertson's Tavern, New Hope Church, and Payne's Farm eventually engaged over sixteen thousand soldiers. After an afternoon of charges and countercharges, neither side could claim a victory when the fighting subsided with the onset of darkness. Veterans on both sides would later recall that day's action as some of the more intense of the entire war.
During the night, Lee pulled his men back to the west side of Mine Run and began entrenching. Meade awoke the next morning to find his adversary well entrenched on high ground protected by a stream to his front. Lee had high hopes that Meade would repeat the error that Ambrose Burnside had made at Fredericksburg less than one year earlier. Meade was not Burnside. After shelling the Confederates for the next two days, while unsuccessfully probing for a weakness in Lee's lines, Meade acquiesced to the futility of launching a hopeless assault against the Rebels. Instead, he wisely turned his army around during the night of December 1-2, and headed north to re-cross the Rapidan. One day later, the army was safely across the river, and Meade went into winter quarters expecting to be harshly criticized by the northern press and his superiors in Washington for the failed campaign. Nonetheless, Meade had no misgivings for his withdrawal. On the night that he ordered an end to the Mine Run Campaign, Meade wrote to his wife that, "I would rather be ignominiously dismissed, and suffer anything, than knowingly and willfully have thousands of brave men slaughtered for nothing. . . . As it is, my conscience is clear. I did the best I could."
Lee, for his part, was visibly frustrated by what he perceived as a lost opportunity. Meade's failure to attack had prompted Lee to order an assault on the Union left flank, scheduled for December 2. With the Rapidan River serving as a troublesome obstacle to a Union retreat, Lee envisioned the possibility of another Confederate victory on a scale with Chancellorsville. When a chagrined Lee discovered Meade's withdrawal, he reportedly stated in front of his staff, "I am too old to command this army. We should never have permitted those people to get away."
The results of the Mine Run Campaign were inconclusive and the casualty rates were roughly comparable. The Unions suffered 2,094 casualties (261 killed, 1,460 wounded, and 373 missing). The Confederacy lost 2,826 soldiers (118 killed, 651 wounded, and 2,057 missing). However, Meade's losses constituted only two percent of the total Federal forces (ninety-six thousand) engaged. Lee's losses constituted five percent of his much smaller force of fifty-six thousand soldiers, underscoring the Confederacy's ultimate inability to wage a war of attrition. Ulysses S. Grant would take note of that fact the following spring when he came east and launched his Overland Campaign.
Cite this Entry
"Mine Run Campaign," Ohio Civil War Central, 2019, Ohio Civil War Central. 18 Oct 2019 <http://www.ohiocivilwarcentral.com/entry.php?rec=1538>
"Mine Run Campaign." (2019) In Ohio Civil War Central, Retrieved October 18, 2019, from Ohio Civil War Central: http://www.ohiocivilwarcentral.com/entry.php?rec=1538
- Ambrose E. Burnside
- Army of Northern Virginia
- Army of the Cumberland
- Army of the Potomac (USA)
- Battle of Boonsboro
- Battle of Bristoe Station
- Battle of Chickamauga
- Battle of Gettysburg
- Battle of Manassas Gap
- Battle of Williamsport
- Braxton Bragg
- Bristoe Campaign
- George G. Meade
- George Sykes
- Gouverneur K. Warren
- James Longstreet
- Jubal Early
- Overland Campaign
- Robert E. Lee
- Ulysses S. Grant
- William H. French
- William S. Rosecrans